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YSURSA AND DAVENPORT: PUTTING A DENT IN UNION ACCESS TO 
MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
 
EDWARD J. SCHOEN∗ 
JOSEPH S. FALCHEK∗∗ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court put a significant dent in 
the ability of unions to collect contributions for political activities from union members 
through payroll deductions.  In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n,1 the United States 
Supreme Court in a six-to-three decision decided that an Idaho statute prohibiting 
counties, municipalities, school districts and other local public employers from 
providing payroll deductions for contributions by public employees to the union’s 
political action committee did not violate the First Amendment.2  “Idaho’s law,” the 
court ruled, “does not restrict political speech, but rather declines to promote that 
speech by allowing public employee check-offs for political activities.”3  The state’s 
decision to prohibit payroll deductions for political contributions, the Court 
determined, was “reasonable in light of the State’s interest in avoiding the appearance 
that carrying out the public’s business is tainted by partisan political activity.”4 
 In Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n,5 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a 
First Amendment challenge to a State of Washington statute that required public sector 
labor unions to receive affirmative authorization from individuals who were not 
members of the union but on whose behalf the union negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement before spending their agency fees for ideological or political purposes 
unrelated to the union’s collective bargaining responsibilities.6  The Court ruled that the 
                                                   
 
 
∗ J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, New 
Jersey. 
∗∗ J.D., Professor of Business Administration, Chairperson of Business Administration and 
Management Department, McGowan School of Business, King’s College, Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania. 
1 Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 172 L. Ed. 2d 770 (2009).  
2 Id. at 775. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).  The U.S. Supreme Court in 
Davenport was unanimous in its judgment and partly unanimous in the opinion by Justice Scalia.  
The Court was unanimous in Parts I and II-A; Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito, did not join Part II-B because it resolved arguments raised for the first time in briefs 
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
6 The State of Washington in the interim amended the statute “to codify a narrower interpretation 
of ‘use’ of agency-shop fees than the interpretation adopted below by the state trial court that 
passed on that question.”  The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court was not moot, 
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affirmative authorization provisions did not violate the First Amendment.7  This 
decision permits states to restrict political activities undertaken by public employee 
unions by making the unions get the nonmembers’ affirmative consent before spending 
mandatory fees for political purposes.8 
 Ysursa and Davenport supplement a long line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
dealing with the First Amendment implications of using union dues and fees for 
political purposes contrary to the viewpoints of individuals compelled to pay them.  
Those eight decisions,9 which were issued during the period 1956 to 1991, and which 
examined the First Amendment implications of compelling membership in unions or 
unions’ representation of workers in collective bargaining, the union’s use of dues and 
fees for political or ideological purposes, and protection of the worker’s right not to be 
associated with or contribute financially to the political speech of the union, provide 
significant protection to workers who object to the use of their dues and fees for 
political activities. 
 The purpose of this article is to examine the protections provided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to workers who object to the use of their dues and fees for political 
purposes, and to determine whether Ysursa and Davenport indicate a willingness by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to alter those protections.  Part II of this article will catalogue the 
major First Amendment protections provided by the eight decisions.  Part III will 
examine the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ysursa, and concludes that Ysursa does not 
represent a major departure from the principles established in the eight decisions.  Part 
IV of this article will examine the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Davenport, and 
concludes Davenport represents a departure from the principles established in the eight 
decisions, and Part V of this article assesses the implications of Davenport’s departure 
from the principles established in the eight decisions.   
 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE USE OF  
UNION DUES AND FEES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES 
 
 The major principles and protections spelled out by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
eight major decisions referred to above are summarized in the following sections.  The 
discussion begins with the constitutionality of the requirement to join a union. 
 
A. COMPELLING WORKERS TO BECOME MEMBERS IN A UNION SHOP AS A CONDITION OF 
EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE REPRESENTED BY A UNION FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
PURPOSES IN AN AGENCY SHOP DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
 In Railway Employes’ Department v. Hanson,10 employees of the Union Pacific 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
however, because petitioners sought money damages for the alleged violation of the prior version 
of the statute.  Id. at 2377 n.1. 
7 Id. at 2382. 
8 Jess Bravin, High Court Allows a Curb on Union Political Activity, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2007, at A3. 
9 Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 76 S. Ct. 714 (1956); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. 
Ct. 1784 (1961); Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 83 S. Ct. 1158 (1963); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Education, 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984); 
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986); Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. 
Ct. 2228 (1990); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
10 Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 76 S. Ct. 714 (1956). 
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Railroad brought suit in Nebraska courts against the railroad and the labor 
organizations representing employees of the railroad to enjoin the enforcement of a 
union shop agreement, which required all employees of the railroad to become 
members of the union within sixty days.11  The plaintiff employees were not members 
of the union, did not want to become members of the union, and did not want to lose 
their jobs and employments benefits if they refused to join the union.12  The employees 
argued that the union shop arrangement authorized by the Railway Labor Act violated 
the “right to work” provision of the Nebraska Constitution.13   
 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor 
Act as a valid exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce Clause to 
“regulate labor relations in interstate commerce,” “encourage the settlement of 
disputes,” and achieve “[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce.”14  The U.S. 
Supreme Court also ruled that the union shop arrangement did not violate the First 
Amendment rights of the union members,15 noting that “there is no more an 
infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case 
of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar,”16 that the 
                                                   
 
 
11 Id. at 716.  Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, authorized 
union-shop agreements between interstate railroads and the unions of their employees.  In the 
union shop arrangement established by the Railway Labor Act, all workers were required to pay 
union dues, initiation fees and assessments and to become members of the union as a condition of 
continued employment within sixty days of their employment.   
12 Id.  The union shop arrangement authorized by Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, 45 
U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, provided: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, or of any other statute or 
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or 
carriers as defined in this Act and a labor organization or labor organizations 
duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with 
the requirements of this Act shall be permitted (a) to make agreements, 
requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days 
following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such 
agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of 
the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such 
agreement shall require such conditions of employment with respect to 
employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms and 
conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to 
employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason 
other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation 
fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required 
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. 
 
Id. at 716 n.2. 
13 Id.  The Nebraska Constitution provides: “No person shall be denied employment because of 
membership in or affiliation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor organization or because 
of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization; nor shall any individual or corporation or 
association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from 
employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor organization.”  Id. at 716 n.1 
(citing NEB. CONST. art XV, § 13). 
14 Id. at 718-19. 
15 Id. at 721. 
16 Id.  
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record contained nothing to demonstrate that mandatory membership in the union 
impaired the union members’ freedom of expression,17 and that the statutory restriction 
against any conditions upon membership in the union except for the payment of dues, 
initiation fees, and assessments safeguarded the union members freedom of 
expression.18  The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “the requirement for financial 
support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is 
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate . . . the 
First Amendment.”19 
The U.S. Supreme Court applied its holding in Hanson to an agency shop 
arrangement in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.20  In Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld a Michigan statute, which authorized union representation of state 
and municipal employees in an “agency shop” arrangement (under which all 
government workers are represented by the union even if they do not join the union), 
and required the government workers represented by the union to pay a service charge 
equal in amount to union dues to the union as a condition of employment.21  The Court 
determined that the union’s assessment of such service charges against nonmembers to 
finance collective bargaining, contract administration, and dispute resolution activities 
did not violate the First Amendment rights of the non-member employees covered by 
the collective bargaining agreement, but was constitutionally justified by the important 
contribution of the agency shop arrangement to the system of labor relations 
established by Congress.22 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its holdings in Hanson and Abood that mandatory 
union membership or representation does not violate the First Amendment in Keller v. 
                                                   
 
 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977).  Some of the analysis of Abood reflected in this 
section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article.  See Edward J. Schoen et al., 
United Foods and Wileman Bros.: Protection Against Compelled  Commercial Speech – Now You See It, 
Now You Don’t, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 476-77 (2002). 
21 Abood, 97 S. Ct. at 1799-1800.  See DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW: 
CASES AND COMMENTS 30 (5th ed. 1990) (“The Court held that a law imposing compulsory service 
charges, equivalent to union dues . . . on union members violated the First Amendment when those 
charges were to be used for political or ideological purposes not related to the union’s role as a 
collective bargaining agent.”). 
22 Abood, 97 S. Ct. at 1794.  The court noted: 
 
The governmental interests advanced by the agency-shop provision in the 
Michigan statute are much the same as those promoted by similar provisions 
in federal labor law.  The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival 
teachers’ unions, holding quite different views as to the proper class hours, 
class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance procedures, each 
sought to obtain the employer’s agreement, are no different in kind from the 
evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid 
. . . .  Thus, insofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the 
Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and 
grievance adjustment, those two decisions of this Court appear to require 
validation of the agency-shop agreement before us. 
 
Id. at 1800. 
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State Bar of California.23  In Keller, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that requiring 
practicing lawyers to become member of the State Bar did not infringe on the First 
Amendment right of freedom of association.24  Just as employees in union shops can be 
required to join the union, an organization that engages in political actions, in order to 
attain the benefits of bringing order to labor relations in railroad industry, so too can 
the State of California require that lawyers practicing law in California join and pay 
dues to their bar association, in order to obtain the benefits of regulating the practice of 
law.25 
 
B. EXPENDITURE OF DUES AND FEES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES VIOLATES  
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF WORKERS WHO OBJECT TO SUCH EXPENDITURES 
 
In International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street,26 members of a group of labor 
organizations representing workers employed by the Southern Railway System in a 
union shop arrangement,27 sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 
collective bargaining agreement, because the unions expended member dues to finance 
political campaigns of candidates for state and federal offices whom they opposed and 
to promote political ideologies with which they disagreed.28  The U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that expenditures of union members’ dues without their consent to assist 
candidates for public office or advance political causes compel the union members to 
support political speech with which they may disagree, contrary to the First 
Amendment.29  In contrast, unions could spend member dues to cover the expenses of 
collective bargaining negotiation and administration and disposition of grievances and 
disputes without the members’ consent, because those purposes fell immediately within 
the reasons advanced by Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act through which 
union shops were authorized in the railroad industry.30  The Court carefully reviewed 
the history of union security in the railway industry and the legislative history of the 
Railway Labor Act, and concluded “that § 2, Eleventh contemplated compulsory 
unionism to force employees to share the costs of negotiating and administering 
collective agreements, and the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes,”31 
that Congress refrained from giving unions “unlimited power to spend exacted 
money,”32 and that section 2, Eleventh, “is to be construed to deny the unions, over an 
                                                   
 
 
23 Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).  Much of the analysis of Keller reflected in 
this section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article.  See Schoen, supra note 
20, at 476-77. 
24 Id. at 2233. 
25 Id. at 2233-34. 
26 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct. 1784 (1961). 
27 The union shop arrangement in Street, based on Section 2, Eleventh, was identical to the union 
shop arrangement in Hudson discussed supra note 11.  Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct. at 
1788 n.1. 
28 Id. at 1787. 
29 Id. at 1800. 
30 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U. S. C. § 152, Eleventh.  The union shop agreement permitted by the Railway 
Labor Act required employees of railroads to pay union dues, initiation fees and assessments as a 
condition of gaining and continuing their employment.  Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct. 
at 1787. 
31 Id. at 1797. 
32 Id. at 1800. 
88/Vol.XIX/Southern Law Journal 
 
employee’s objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes 
which he opposes.”33 
The U.S. Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in dealing with the agency 
shop arrangement in Abood.34  In Abood, several teachers alleged that the union engaged 
in economic and political activities that they did not approve, and used service fees they 
were required to pay under the agency shop arrangement to support those activities.35  
                                                   
 
 
33 Id.  In Comm’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court reached 
the same conclusion: the union was prohibited from spending dues and fees for political purposes 
to which nonmembers objected under the National Labor Relations Act Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.S. § 
158(a)(3).  The National Labor Relations Act Section 8(a)(3) is the equivalent of Section 2, Eleventh 
under the Railway Labor Act.  As amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, or Taft 
Hartley Act, 29 U. S. C. §158(a)(3), the National Labor Relations Act permits the employer and the 
exclusive bargaining representative to agree that all employees in the bargaining unit must pay 
periodic dues and fees as a condition of continued employment, and prohibits any discrimination 
in hiring or terms of employment against an employee for nonmembership in the union except for 
the payment of dues and initiation fees.  Relying on Street, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Beck 
that Section 8(a)(3) prohibits a union, over the objections of nonmembers who have paid their dues, 
to spend objecting nonmember dues on activities unrelated to collective bargaining activities.  Id. at 
2657.  Unlike Street, however, the basis of the Court’s decision in Beck was the language in the 
statute, not the First Amendment.  This disparity troubles one commentator: 
 
In determining whether sufficient state action exists to trigger First 
Amendment protection for private-sector cases arising under the RLA or the 
NLRA, the Court appears to have two positions.  For cases premised on the 
RLA, the Court conceded that Hanson determined ‘that because the RLA pre-
empts all state laws banning union-security agreements, the negotiation and 
enforcement of such provisions in railroad industry contracts involves 
‘governmental action’ and is therefore subject to constitutional limitations.’  
For cases arising under the NLRA, the Court has stated that it is simply not 
required to decide that issue.  While solicitous regarding First Amendment 
issues, the Court appears to prefer to escape grounding its decisions in the 
Constitution.  Instead, it works around the Constitution and discovers an 
alternative basis for granting relief to dues objectors or rules against them.  In 
the Beck case, for instance, the Court found that the duty of fair representation 
constituted a sufficient basis to grant dues objector’s relief despite the District 
court’s determination that ‘[the] disbursement of agency fees for purposes 
other than bargaining unit representation violated the associational and free 
speech right of objecting nonmembers. 
 
Harry G. Hutchinson, Reclaiming the First Amendment Through Union Dues Restrictions?, 10 U. PA. J. 
BUS. & EMP. L. 663, 695 (2008).  
34 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977).  Some of the analysis of Abood reflected in this 
section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article.  See Schoen, supra note 20, at 
476-77. 
35 Abood, 97 S. Ct. at 1788.  Under the agency shop clause, teachers were not required to become 
members of the union.  Teachers who did not become members of the union, however, were 
required within sixty days of hire to pay the union a service charge equal in amount to the regular 
dues paid by union members.  Teachers who did not pay the service charge were discharged from 
employment.  Id. at 1788.  Under the National Labor Relations Act, regulation of the labor relations 
of state and local governments is left to the states, and Michigan permitted employees of local 
government units to exercise the same rights as those protected by Federal law: the right to self 
organization, to bargain collectively, and to use secret ballots in representation elections.  Id. at 
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The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the union was prohibited from requiring an 
employee to pay dues and fees to support of an ideological cause he or she may oppose 
as a condition of holding a job as a public school teacher.36  The Court reasoned that the 
First Amendment protects the right of individuals to refuse to associate with others and 
to refuse to contribute funds to associations that advance ideas and promote beliefs, and 
that those First Amendment protections are not surrendered by virtue of public 
employment.37  Hence, the state cannot under the First Amendment mandate 
association with a political point of view as a condition of retaining public 
employment.38  The Court emphasized, however, that its decision did not prohibit the 
union from spending money to advance political or ideological viewpoints or promote 
the candidacy of individuals to public office.39  Those expenditures, however, must be 
financed by the dues and fees paid by union members who neither object to nor are not 
coerced to support those viewpoints by the threat of loss of public sector employment.40 
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed the First Amendment protection 
against expenditure of dues for political purposes without the consent of the member in 
Keller v. State Bar of California.41  In Keller, members of the State Bar of California objected 
to the use of a portion of their mandatory membership dues to support political and 
ideological activities with which they disagreed.42  The U.S. Supreme Court determined 
that the relationship between the California State Bar and its members was substantially 
analogous to the relationship between a union and its members.43  This permitted the 
Court to apply the Abood analysis to the State Bar’s use of member dues,44 and to 
conclude that the First Amendment prohibits the State Bar from spending member dues 
on political or ideological activities unless those expenditures are necessarily or 
reasonably incurred to regulate the legal profession or improve the quality of legal 
services.45  It was also entirely appropriate that lawyers who benefited from their 
admission to the practice of law before the courts should be required to pay a fair share 
of the costs of regulating the legal profession and enhancing the educational and ethical 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
1793. 
36 Id. at 1799-1800. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id. (“We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for expression of political 
views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not 
germane to its duties as a collective bargaining representative.”)  In making these political 
expenditures, the union must act “consistently with any applicable (and constitutional) system of 
election campaign regulation.”  Id. at 1800 n.32. 
40 Id. at 1800.   
41 Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).  Much of the analysis of Keller reflected in 
this section appeared in a prior article written by the authors of this article.  See Schoen, supra note 
20, at 476-77. 
42 Id. at 2231. 
43 Id. at 2235. 
44 Id. at 2235-36. 
45 Id.  The Court also notes that compliance with Abood and Keller is neither difficult nor 
burdensome.  Rather, the constitutional requirements for the collection and use of fees are 
providing an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to 
challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker, and an escrow for the amounts 
reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.  Id. at 2237; accord Chicago Teachers 
Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1076 n.17 (1986). 
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standards of the admitted lawyers.46 
 
C. UNION MEMBERS WHO OBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF DUES FOR POLITICAL OR 
IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSES AND WHO ARE CURRENT IN THE PAYMENT OF THEIR DUES ARE 
ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF THOSE DUES PLUS APPROPRIATE INTEREST, AND THE BURDEN 
OF ESTABLISHING THE AMOUNT TO BE REFUNDED IS IMPOSED ON THE UNION 
 
In Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen,47 employees of the Southern Railway 
Company, who, like the employees in Street, were obligated to pay dues, fees and 
assessments to various labor organizations as a condition of their continuing 
employment in a union shop arrangement, obtained an injunction against the 
enforcement of the labor agreement, because the union used the collected dues to lobby 
for and against legislation, to influence votes in public elections, and to make campaign 
contributions.48  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled the injunction contained four fatal flaws.  
First, the injunction covered all workers, not just those who objected to the 
expenditures.49  Second, the injunction covered all union dues, not just those dues used 
for political purposes thereby interfering with the union’s ability to undertake collective 
bargaining activities.50  Third, the injunction was issued without any determination by 
the union of the percentage of union dues used for political purposes,51 the burden of 
proof of which rests with the union.52  Fourth, the injunction should have directed the 
union to refund that portion of the collected funds in the same proportion that the 
union’s political expenditures bear to total union expenditures, and to reduce future 
collections of dues and fees by the same proportion.53 
The Court’s holding in Allen was affirmed in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks.54  
In Ellis, clerical employees of Western Airlines objected to the use of assessed agency 
fees (equal in amount to union member dues) in support of political activities, and 
challenged the adequacy of the rebate procedures implemented by the union to 
reimburse them for that portion of their agency fees used for those purposes.55  The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the rebate scheme employed by the union was inadequate, 
because the collection and utilization of union fees for improper purposes followed by a 
rebate of those improper expenditures amounts to “an involuntary loan for purposes to 
which the employee objects.”56  Because readily available and convenient means exist to 
ameliorate the wrongful though temporary use of the funds (e.g., advanced reduction of 
dues or interest bearing escrow accounts), the union’s temporary use of the funds for 
improper purposes violates the statute.57  In other words, the union was required to 
                                                   
 
 
46 Id. at 2236. 
47 Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 83 S. Ct. 1158 (1963). 
48 Id. at 1160. 
49 Id. at 1162. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 1163. 
52 Id. at 1164. 
53 Id. 
54 Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984). 
55 Id. at 1888, 1888 n.3.  The clerical workers did not object to their mandatory union membership 
required by the union shop arrangement; that claim was precluded by Railway Employees v. 
Hanson, 76 S. Ct. 714 (1956).  See Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1887. 
56 Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1890. 
57 Id.   
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provide more than a “pure” rebate remedy that permits it to expend fees for political 
purposes and then later refund that portion of the fee to the worker.  The union must 
either pay interest on the amount refunded or provide a mechanism to permit the 
worker to reduce his service fee payments prospectively by the portion employed for 
political ideological purposes.58   
The U.S. Supreme Court further amplified the refund remedy that unions must 
provide to objecting workers in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.59  In Hudson, several 
workers represented by the union objected to the use of their dues for purposes not 
related to collective bargaining and challenged the procedure implemented by the 
union to handle their objections.60  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the procedures 
enacted by the union to deal with nonmember objections were inadequate for three 
reasons.  First, the union was permitted to use the objectors’ dues temporarily for 
purposes to which they objected, rather than preliminarily obtaining their consent to 
finance activities unrelated to collective bargaining.61  Second, the procedures failed to 
provide nonmembers with sufficient information about the basis on which the 
proportionate share was calculated in advance of their raising an objection; instead, the 
union provided information about the calculation of the proportionate share after the 
objectors filed their objections.62  Further, the information ultimately provided to the 
objectors was inadequate, because it failed to disclose the expenditures for collective 
bargaining and administration that benefited all members and nonmembers alike and 
for which a fee could be charged; the mere disclosure of a percentage of expenditures 
does not explain why they were required to pay dues.63  Third, the procedure failed to 
provide “a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision maker.”64  The Court 
noted that, because the agency shop arrangement effects an infringement on First 
Amendment rights of association,65 the nonunion employee “is entitled to have his 
                                                   
 
 
58 Id.  
59 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986). 
60 Id. at 1071.   
61 Id. at 1075. 
62 Id. at 1075-76. 
63 Id. at 1076.  Notably, the Court prefaced its determination that insufficient information was 
provided to the nonmembers by reiterating its language in Abood placing the burden of proof on the 
union.  The court noted: 
 
In Abood, we reiterated that the nonunion employee has the burden of raising 
an objection, but that the union retains the burden of proof: ‘Since the unions 
possess the facts and records from which the proportion of political to total 
union expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of 
fairness compel that they, not the individual employees, bear the burden of 
proving such proportion.’  Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concern 
for the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that the potential 
objectors be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s 
fee.  Leaving the nonunion employees in the dark about the source of the 
figure for the agency fee - and requiring them to object in order to receive 
information - does not adequately protect the careful distinctions drawn in 
Abood. 
 
Id. at 1075-76 (citations omitted). 
64 Id. at 1076. 
65 Id. at 1076 n.20 (citing Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455). 
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objections addressed in expeditious, fair, and objective manner.”66  The procedure 
employed by the union did not meet this standard, because it permitted the union, an 
interested party, to control the process from the moment the process begins (collection 
of the dues), through the two-step appeal process (controlled by the union executive 
committee and union executive board), and through the final arbitration (decided by a 
union-selected arbitrator).67  In sum, “the original Union procedure was inadequate, 
because it failed to minimize the risk that nonunion employees’ contributions might be 
used for impermissible purposes, because it failed to provide adequate justification for 
the advance reduction of dues, and because it failed to offer a reasonably prompt 
decision by an impartial decisionmaker.”68 
Notably, then, Hudson requires the union to make significant disclosures to 
employees so that they can make an informed decision to object to the expenditures of 
dues and fees for purposes not related to collective bargaining, contract administration, 
and grievance adjustment.  More particularly, the union must inform the employees (1) 
how it calculated the proportion of expenditures for activities unrelated to collective 
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, and (2) the nature of 
expenditures included under the category of collective bargaining and contract 
administration that benefited members and nonmembers alike.69  Further, the union’s 
disclosure of this information must be made before the employee is given the 
opportunity to object to expenditure of dues and fees for purposes not related to 
collective bargaining and contract administration.  As discussed in Part IV below, those 
protections were not provided by the union to employees in Davenport, a shortcoming 
overlooked by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision. 
 
D. THE UNION’S ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE CHARGES AGAINST NONMEMBERS IN AN 
AGENCY SHOP DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF WORKERS WHO 
WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE UNION TO THE EXTENT THOSE FEES ARE EXPENDED FOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION PURPOSES 
 
In Ellis, the U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the nature of expenses that may 
properly be paid from union dues and service charges.  The test employed by the Court 
to determine the propriety of these expenditures was “whether the challenged 
                                                   
 
 
66 Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1076. 
67 Id. at 1076-77. 
68 Id. at 1077.  The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected the Union’s argument that the implementation 
of an escrow arrangement through which 100% of the dues of objecting nonmembers were held 
intact pending resolution of the member’s objection was sufficient, because, while it prevented the 
improper use of objector’s dues, it failed to satisfy the second (adequate explanation of the use of 
fees) and third (prompt decision) criteria.  Id.   
69 One commentator debunked the effectiveness and truthfulness of these disclosures: 
 
[L]abor unions aware of judicial precedent have an incentive to shield 
ideological and other nonrepresentational expenditures from scrutiny.  A 
truthful response to the question of which expenditures are expended 
impermissibly may deprive unions of such funds.  Unions have reason to blur 
the lines between germane and nongermane expenditures by suggesting that 
all expenditures are required to fulfill their collective-bargaining role. 
 
Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 694. 
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expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the 
duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on 
labor-management issues.”70  Notably, under this test:  
 
[O]bjecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of 
not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a 
collective-bargaining contract and of settling grievances and 
disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings 
normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the 
duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees at 
the bargaining unit.71 
 
Hence, objecting employees may be required to pay fees to the union to support 
the direct costs of collective bargaining activities and those activities that are normally 
and reasonably employed to carry out those collective bargaining activities.  Using that 
test, the Court concluded that the following expenses are sufficiently related to 
collective bargaining to be paid from union dues: (1) travel expenses to attend national 
conventions during which officers are elected and guidance on collective bargaining is 
provided; (2) refreshments for members during business meetings and social activities; 
(3) publications which inform union members about negotiations, contract demands, 
employee benefits, proposed legislation, and recreational and social activities; and (4) 
litigation expenses related to negotiating and administering the collective bargaining 
agreement and settling grievances.72  The Court also determined that the expenses 
related to organizing and recruiting additional union members were not sufficiently 
related to collective bargaining activities to be paid from union dues, and refrained 
from expressing an opinion on the death benefits paid to union members, because the 
record was unclear whether or not the objecting employees were entitled to receive the 
death benefits.73 
In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n,74 the U.S. Supreme Court amplified its decision in 
Ellis.  In Lehnert, faculty members employed by Ferris State College, a state-related 
public institution of higher education supported by the State of Michigan, objected to 
                                                   
 
 
70 Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1892.   
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 1892-95.  The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed the conclusion that litigation expenses 
were chargeable expenses in its unanimous decision:  
 
[C]osts of that litigation are chargeable provided the litigation meets the 
relevant standards for charging other national expenditures that the Lehnert 
majority enunciated.  Under those standards, a local union may charge a 
nonmember an appropriate share of its contribution to a national's litigation 
expenses if (1) the subject matter of the national litigation bears an 
appropriate relation to collective bargaining and (2) the arrangement is 
reciprocal -- that is, the local's payment to the national affiliate is for services 
that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by 
virtue of their membership in the parent organization. 
 
Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798, 806 (2009) 
73 Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1893, 1895. 
74 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
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the expenditures of funds by the Ferris Faculty Association, the exclusive bargaining 
representative of the faculty in an agency shop arrangement.75  The objecting faculty 
members claimed that the expenditures in question were used for purposes other than 
negotiating and administering the collective bargaining agreement, thereby violating 
their First Amendment Rights.76  The U.S. Supreme Court initiated its analysis by 
summarizing Hanson, Street, Allen, Abood, and Ellis as follows:  
 
[C]hargeable activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-bargaining 
activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest in 
labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not significantly add 
to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of 
an agency or union shop.77 
 
The Court in its plurality opinion then resolved the six categories of payments 
challenged by the dissenting employees, and decided dissenting union members’ dues 
could properly be expended on: (1) the “pro rata share of the costs associated with 
otherwise chargeable activities of the state and national affiliates, even if those activities 
were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees’ bargaining unit”78; 
(2) the expenses of attending and participating in union conventions, because 
“bargaining strategies and representational policies” are developed at those meetings 
and those activities are “essential to the union’s discharge of its duties as bargaining 
agent”79; and (3) the expenses of preparing for a strike, even if the strike is illegal, 
because those expenses “aid [collective bargaining] negotiations and inure to the direct 
benefit of members of the dissenters’ unit” and do not further burden their First 
Amendment rights.80   
The Court also decided that the following expenses could not be paid by dissenting 
members’ dues: (1) lobbying and political activities “outside the limited context of 
contract ratification or implementation,” because such expenditures “use each dissenter 
as ‘an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable’”81; (2) public education programs through publications of the union, 
because the union did not demonstrate how the public education programs was 
“oriented toward the ratification or implementation of petitioners’ collective-bargaining 
agreement”82; and (3) public relations expenses incurred to enhance the reputation and 
                                                   
 
 
75 Id. at 1955-56. 
76 Id. at 1956. 
77 Id. at 1959.  The Court rejected a more stringent test that required “a direct relationship between 
the expense at issue and some tangible benefit to the dissenters’ bargaining unit.”  Id. at 1961.  One 
commentator observed that the refusal to adopt the more stringent test “has consequences because 
it may encourage subsequent courts to conclude that a union does not act unlawfully by charging 
expenses that are for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local 
union . . . .  This may be a mistake ‘because virtually any activity may ultimately inure to the benefit 
of members.’”  See Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 690. 
78 Id. at 1961.  See Locke, supra note 72 (deciding unanimously that the local union’s share of the 
national's litigation expenses are chargeable, and thereby affirming the plurality determination in 
Lehnert). 
79 Id. at 1965. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1960-61. 
82 Id. at 1963. 
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standing of public school teachers and their profession, because they “entailed speech 
of a political nature in a public forum,” were not “sufficiently related to the union’s 
collective bargaining functions to justify compelling dissenting employees to support 
it,” and imposed a “substantially greater burden upon First Amendment rights.”83 
 
III. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN YSURSA 
 
In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n,84 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that an 
Idaho statute entitled “Voluntary Contributions Act,” which prohibited the use of 
payroll deductions for political activities from wages of employees of the state and its 
political divisions, did not violate the First Amendment.85  Labor organizations 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute before it went into effect.86  The District 
court rejected the labor unions’ argument with respect to the state, but upheld their 
challenge with respect to local governments.87  Analogizing the relationship between 
the State and its political subdivisions to that between the State and a regulated private 
utility,88 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals treated the prohibition on payroll 
deductions at the local level as a content-based restriction on speech, applied strict 
scrutiny, and held the statute unconstitutional as applied at the local level.89  The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether “the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution prohibit[s] a state legislature from removing the authority of 
                                                   
 
 
83 Id. at 1964. 
84 Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 172 L. Ed. 2d 770 (2009).  
85 Id. at 775.  
86 Id. at 776.  
87 Id.  
88 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public 
Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) in reaching its conclusion that the 
relationship between the State and its political subdivisions was analogous to that between the 
State and regulated public utilities.  Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 777, 780.  In Consolidated Edison, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that an order of the New York Public Service Commission prohibiting the 
inclusion of utility company inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy in its monthly 
bills violated the First Amendment.  Noting that corporations are entitled to freedom of speech, the 
Court ruled that none of the interests advanced by the Commission - protecting the utility’s 
customers from having views forced upon them, allocating limited space in the billing envelopes in 
the public interest, and ensuring ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill inserts - was a 
compelling state interest justifying the prohibition on the utility company’s speech.  Billed 
customers were a “captive audience,” but they could simply toss the insert away in the 
wastebasket; billing envelopes were not, unlike broadcast frequencies, part of a scarce, publicly 
owned resource; and there was no basis to assume the Commission could not exclude the costs of 
the bill inserts from the utility’s rate base.   
The U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986).  In Pacific Gas, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that the order of the California Public Utilities Commission requiring Pacific Gas and 
Electric Co. (PG&E) to include communications prepared by a public interest organization in its 
billing envelopes violated the First Amendment rights of PG&E, because PG&E was required to use 
its own property to disseminate the views of others with which it disagrees contrary to the First 
Amendment. 
89 Ysursa 172 L. Ed. 2d at 777.  See Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heidemen, 504 F.3d 1053, 1059 (2007).  
Neither party challenged the District Court’s determination with respect to state level employees.  
Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d. at 776.   
96/Vol.XIX/Southern Law Journal 
 
state political subdivisions to make payroll deductions for political activities under a 
statute that is concededly valid as applied to state government employers.”90 
In response to the labor union’s argument that the Idaho statute employed a 
content-based restriction and hence was subject to strict scrutiny,91 the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted that the state is “not required to assist others in funding the expression of 
particular ideas, including political ones,”92 and that Davenport confirms the state’s right 
to decline to assist political speech by collecting political contributions via payroll 
deduction in the absence of the specific consent of the worker.93  Similarly, “Idaho does 
not suppress political speech but simply declines to promote it through public 
employer checkoffs for political activities.”94   
Acknowledging that payroll deductions “enhance the unions’ exercise of First 
Amendment rights” and that the Idaho elimination of payroll deductions made it more 
difficult for the union to raise funds for political activities,95 the Court noted that 
Idaho’s decision not to provide payroll deductions for political activities is not an 
abridgment of the unions' speech, because the unions “are free to engage in such speech 
as they see fit.  They simply are barred from enlisting the State in support of that 
endeavor.”96  Hence, the Court concluded, Idaho's decision to prohibit payroll 
deductions "is not subject to strict scrutiny,"97 and Idaho “need only demonstrate a 
rational basis to justify the ban on political payroll deductions.”98  A sufficient rational 
basis exists at the state level, the Court noted, in the state’s interest in avoiding the 
“appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics.”99  
Because municipal organizations are merely "subordinate governmental 
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental 
functions,"100 the same rational basis exists at the political subdivision level: states may 
prohibit payroll deductions of political contributions to advance the state’s interest “in 
separating the operation of government from partisan politics.”101  Having concluded 
the state demonstrated a sufficient rational basis for its decision to eliminate payroll 
deductions at the local level, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.102   
                                                   
 
 
90 The question presented appears in the docket of U.S. Supreme Court, at http://origin.www. 
supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-00869qp.pdf, (last visited March 17, 2009) (original in possession of 
Edward J. Schoen).  The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted on March 31, 2008.  See docket of 
U.S. Supreme Court, accessed on March 19, 2009, at 
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-869.htm (last visited March 17, 2009) (original 
in possession of Edward J. Schoen). 
91 Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 777. 
92 Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (noting that 
Congress can decide that tax-exempt organizations should not further benefit at the expense of 
taxpayers at large by obtaining a further subsidy for lobbying)). 
93 Ysursa, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 779.   
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 777. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 778. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 779. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 780.   
102 Id. at 781.  By reversing the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved inconsistent rulings 
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Ysursa appears to be a fairly straight-forward decision garnering the votes of both 
liberal and conservative justices103 and demonstrating simply that “the legal 
controversy” over upholding paycheck protection “was more contrived than real.”104  
The biggest downfall from the decision, it appears, is the diminished ability of unions to 
raise political activities contributions via payroll deduction and the increased burden 
imposed on the union to solicit and collect those contributions directly from its 
members.105   
Notably, Ysursa does not appear to represent a departure from the principles and 
protections provided to workers who do not wish their dues and fees to be used for 
political purposes to which they object.  Their First Amendment freedom of association 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
rendered by three federal circuit courts of appeal and an Ohio appellate court dealing with almost 
identical state statutes.  See Jay E. Grenig, May a State Legislature Prohibit State Political Subdivisions 
from Making Payroll Deductions for Political Activities?, 2 ABA PREVIEW 113 (2008).  Grenig writes:  
 
Both the Ninth Circuit in Pocatello Education Association and the Tenth 
Circuit in Utah Education Association v. Shurtleff, 512 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 
2008), held a statutory prohibition of payroll deductions for political activities 
to be unconstitutional.  The Sixth Circuit in Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. 
Pizza, 154 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998), has held a similar statute to be 
constitutional.  In a state-court decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals held a 
statute prohibiting payroll deductions for political activities was 
unconstitutional because, “The prohibition on direct partisan political 
expression by labor organizations strikes at the core of the electoral process 
and constitutional freedom of speech.”   
 
Id. at 116. 
103 Chief Justice Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito joined.  Justice Ginsburg joined as to Parts I and III, and also filed an opinion 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.   
104 See M. Royce Van Tassell, “Taxpayers shouldn’t have to subsidize political donations for 
unions,” DESERT MORNING NEWS, March 8, 2009, at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb
=21_T6049667705&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T604966
7712&cisb=22_T6049667711&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=164282&docNo=1 (last visited 
March 16,2009) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen). 
105 See Wendy Leonard, DESERT MORNING NEWS, February 25, 2009, at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/ 
lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6049667705&format=GNBF
I&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T6049667712&cisb=22_T6049667711&tree
Max=true&treeWidth=0&csi=164282&docNo=7 (last visited March 16, 2009) (original in possession 
of Edward J. Schoen) (“During the one year that the Voluntary Contributions Act was in effect in 
Utah, the UEA political-action committee’s fundraising fell 75 percent, and the Utah Public 
Employee Association political action committee’s fundraising dropped to zero.”).  A spokesman 
for the Idaho Education Association expressed disappointment, but said the union has “moved on.”  
See Mark Welsh, “Supreme Court Backs Idaho's Payroll-Deduction Curb,” EDUC. WK., March 4, 
2009, at http://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6049667705&format=G
NBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T6049667712&cisb=22_T6049667711
&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=313401&docNo=8 (last visited March 19, 2009) (original in 
possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“[I]n in the wake of the passage of the 2003 law, IEA members 
moved away from payroll deductions and toward electronic funds transfer as a means of making 
their political donations.”). 
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is not affected.  There is no indication worker contributions to the union’s political-
action committee were deducted from their wages without their consent.  There was no 
wrongful retainer of contributions or failure to provide prompt refunds with interest of 
political activities contributions erroneously deducted.  There was no indication the 
contributions obtained via payroll deduction were expended for unauthorized 
purposes.  Hence, Ysursa is fairly unremarkable in so far as the canon of principles 
governing political use of union dues and fees.  
 
IV. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN DAVENPORT  
 
As noted above in the introduction to this article, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n106 upheld a Washington State statute that 
required public sector labor unions to obtain affirmative authorizations from employees 
in a agency shop who were not members of the union but were required to pay service 
fees to the union before spending those fees for political purposes to which the 
employees objected.107  The State of Washington permitted the unions to charge 
nonmembers a service fee equal in amount to the union dues it collected from members; 
both the service fee and the union dues were collected via payroll deduction.108  
Further, because the service fee was the same amount as the union dues, the service fee 
collected necessarily exceeded the costs of collective bargaining, contract 
administration, and grievance adjustment.109  The union sent “Hudson packets” to all 
nonmembers twice a year, in which they asked the nonmembers to select one of three 
options: agree to pay the full agency fee within thirty days, object to payment of 
nonchargeable expenses and receive a rebate calculated by the union, or object to 
payment of nonchargeable expenses and receive a rebate calculated by an arbitrator.110  
These arrangements permitted the nonmembers to “opt out” from the payment of 
excess service fees, rather than permitting them to “opt in” to the payment of excess 
service fees.111 
Contending that these arrangements failed to meet the affirmative authorization 
requirements of the statute, the State of Washington filed suit against the union, and 
several nonmembers of the union initiated a separate class action lawsuit against the 
union to recover union expenditures for political purposes.112  The trial court in the 
State of Washington action decided the union failed to comply with the affirmative 
authorization requirements, and awarded the State money and injunctive relief.113  The 
trial court in the nonmembers’ action found in favor of the nonmembers and certified 
                                                   
 
 
106 Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007). 
107 Id. at 2383.  The statute provided: “A labor organization may not use agency shop fees paid by 
an individual who is not a member of the organization to make contributions or expenditures to 
influence an election or to operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the 
individual.  Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760. 
108 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377. 
109 Erik S. Jaffe, Campaign Finance and Free Speech: When Easy Cases Make Bad Law: Davenport v. 
Washington Education Association, 2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 115, 116.   
110 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377-78. 
111 See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 117.   
112 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378. 
113 Id.  
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the class.114  After intermediate appellate proceedings, the Washington Supreme Court 
ruled (1) agency fee jurisprudence attempts to establish a balance between the First 
Amendment rights of the nonmembers and the First Amendment rights of the union, 
and (2) the affirmative authorization requirements of the statute interfered with that 
balance and violated the First Amendment right of the union.115  The Court reasoned 
that the burden of objecting to the expenditure should be shouldered by the 
nonmembers rather than the union.116  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court 
of Washington relied on language in Street that a union member’s dissent from the use 
of union dues for political purposes should not be presumed.  Rather, the dissenting 
member should make his or her dissent known to the union.117   
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari118 and decided that the Washington 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the agency fee cases missed the mark.  With respect 
to the Washington Supreme Court’s reliance on the language in Street that dissent is not 
to be presumed, the U.S. Supreme Court insisted that language “meant only that it 
would be improper for a court to enjoin the expenditure of the agency fees of all 
employees, including those who had not objected, when the statutory or constitutional 
limitation established in those cases could be satisfied by a narrower remedy.”119   
The U.S. Supreme Court also disagreed with the Washington Supreme Court 
determination that unions have a First Amendment right to utilize service fees for 
political purposes.  Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court insisted, “unions have no 
constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees,” and the First 
Amendment is not “implicated whenever governments place limitations on the union’s 
entitlement to agency fees above and beyond what Abood and Hudson require.”120   
In the U.S. Supreme Court’s view, Hudson provides “a minimum set of procedures 
by which a [public sector] union in an agency-shop relationship could meet its 
requirements under Abood,” and the fact that the State of Washington “required more 
                                                   
 
 
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 2379.   
117 See State of Washington v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 130 P.3d 352, 358-59 (2006).  See Patrice 
Wade DiPietro, Authorization Required For Certain Union Spending, 9 LAW. J. 2 (2007) (“[The 
Washington Supreme Court] concluded that Section 760 was unconstitutional because it believed 
that agency-fee cases, having balanced the constitutional rights of unions and nonmembers, 
dictated that a nonmember must shoulder the burden of objecting before a union can be barred 
from spending nonmember fees for impermissible purposes [under Abood].  The court also reached 
its conclusion by stating that dissent is not to be presumed - - it must affirmatively be made known 
to the union by the dissenting employee.”). 
118 That the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari surprised at least one commentator.  “The Court 
granted certiorari, even though the State of Washington had modified its statute, few other states 
had similar provisions, and there was no apparent circuit conflict.  Perhaps the Court just wanted to 
deprive the union of a victory, or maybe it just did not have many cases to occupy its time.”  
Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s 2006-2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet But Revealing 
Term, 11 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y 219, 248-49 (2007).   
119 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.  See DiPietro, supra note 117 (“The court opined that the lower court 
read far too much into its admonition that ‘dissent is not to be presumed,’ clarifying that it only 
meant that it would be improper for a court to enjoin the expenditure of the agency fees of all 
employees, including those who had not objected, when statutory or constitutional requirements 
could be satisfied by a narrower remedy.”).  
120 Id.  Citing Lincoln Fed. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 334 U.S. 525, 529-31 (1949), the 
U.S. Supreme Court noted that the State of Washington could eliminate the agency fee entirely.  Id. 
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than the Hudson minimum does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny.”121  In other 
words, the minimum requirements imposed by Hudson are the “constitutional floor” for 
expending agency fees, and Hudson’s minimum requirements are not “a constitutional 
ceiling for state-imposed restrictions,” which trigger First Amendment review.122  Thus, 
while the Hudson language suggests that requiring parties to opt out is the proper 
course of action, it is not a constitutional requirement.123  Hence, state legislatures can 
further restrict (and indeed eliminate entirely) the union’s entitlement to use the dues 
and fees of nonmembers beyond the requirements of Abood and Hudson without 
violating the First Amendment.  Quite simply, the union is entitled to collect agency 
fees from nonmembers only because the State of Washington compelled nonmembers 
to pay those fees, and the requirement that nonmembers consent to the expenditure of 
collected fees for political purpose to which the nonmembers object is simply a 
condition imposed on the union’s entitlement to spend “other people’s money,”124 and in 
no way restricts the union right to  expend funds for political purposes.125 
Four aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision deserve attention.  First, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stressed that its decision applied only to public-sector unions and not 
private-sector unions, even though the language of the Washington statute “applies on 
its face to both public- and private-sector unions in Washington.”126 
                                                   
 
 
121 Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.  The curt language employed by the 
Court caused a sympathetic response from one commentator: “Reading the opinion, one comes 
away feeling a bit sorry for the union.  The tone of the opinion seemed to chide the union for daring 
to complain about restrictions on fees it had no right to in the first place. . . .  Indeed, the case 
manifests a certain hostility to unions and their gumption, which was evident by the Court taking 
the case in the first place.”  Selmi, supra note 118, at 251. 
122 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.   
123 See Selmi, supra note 118, at 249.  Selmi writes:  
 
[T]he Hudson language suggested that requiring parties to opt out of the 
agency fees would be the proper course, but what the language did not 
indicate is whether that was a constitutional requirement.  Based on the 
language from Hudson, it would be constitutionally problematic for a court to 
invalidate an opt-out requirement, but the question posed in this case was 
whether a state legislature could mandate an opt-in requirement.  To the 
Court, that was a very different question.  As the Court explained, “the mere 
fact that Washington required more than the Hudson minimum does not 
trigger First Amendment scrutiny.  The constitutional floor for union’s 
collection and spending of agency fees is not also a constitutional ceiling for 
state-imposed restrictions.” 
 
Id. 
124 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.  One commentator criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court for not going 
farther and upholding the Washington State statute on the grounds it better protects the First 
Amendment rights of the objecting members: “I think the dispositive consideration is that not only 
did the Union lack any ‘right’ to the excess fees, but in fact the First Amendment rights of the 
nonmember employees precluded the state from giving the Union the power to compel even the 
initial payment of such excess fees.”  See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 122. 
125 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380 n.2.   
126 Id. at 2382 (“We emphasize an important limitation upon our holding: we uphold § 760 only as 
applied to public-sector unions such as respondent.  Section 760 applies on its face to both public- 
and private-sector unions in Washington.  Since private-sector unions collect agency fees through 
contractually required action taken by private employers rather than by government agencies, 
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Second, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Davenport and the Washington statute 
affect only those fees paid by employees who are not members of the union; they do not 
affect the union’s ability to access and spend the dues of its own members.127  During 
the period 1996 to 2000, Washington Education Association (WEA) had approximately 
3,500 nonmembers per year, about five percent of the total number of persons 
represented by WEA.128  The decision will not affect the 70,000 or so members of 
WEA.129 
Third, Davenport permitted the State of Washington to restrict the union’s 
expenditures for political purposes solely from the dues or fees of the workers who 
affirmatively “opt in” by approving the payment beforehand.130  In contrast, the cases 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
Washington’s regulation of those private arrangements presents a somewhat different 
constitutional question.”).  In making this distinction, the Court also hinted that the answer for 
private-sector unions might not be different.  Id. at 2382 n.4 (“We do not suggest that the answer 
must be different.  We have previously construed the authorization of private-sector agency-shop 
arrangements in National Labor Relations Act in a manner that is arguably content based.”); see 
DiPietro, supra note117 (noting  that section 760 was upheld only as applied to public-sector unions 
and that  regulation of private sector unions presents a different constitutional question that the 
court did not address). 
The failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to apply its ruling to both public- and private-sector 
unions troubled one commentator:  
 
[T]he Davenport Court could not find a basis to validate the § 760 with 
respect to private-sector workers.  This is troubling because it is difficult to 
separate public- from private-sector labor unions.  . . .  If a state fails to outlaw 
private-sector union-shops and union security agreements sanctioned by the 
NLRA, it appears that just as much governmental coercion is present as the 
Court has found in cases arising under public-sector bargaining statutes.  
Private-sector employers and labor unions operating under the aegis of the 
NLRA or the RLA were ceded authority by the Federal government to coerce 
private sector dues payments from dissenting employees, enforceable 
through the right to terminate workers for nonpayment of sues. 
 
Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 707-08.  Further, “public and private sector unions and their 
respective revenues cannot be clearly divided since they are often both affiliate members of, and 
contribute to the same national labor organization and share the same mission [and] because 
approximately one-half of a typical union’s financial activity occurs at the national level.”  Id. at 712.   
127 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380 n.2 (2007) (“The only reason [the union’s] use of its member’s dues 
was burdened is that respondent chose to comingle those dues with nonmembers’ agency fees.”). 
128 State of Washington v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 130 P.3d 352, 354 (2006).   
129 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378 (“Respondent [is] the exclusive bargaining agent for approximately 
70,000 public education employees . . . .”). 
130 Erwin Chermerinsky & Marci A. Hamilton, Nineteenth Annual Supreme Court Review: First 
Amendment Decisions from the October 2006 Term, 23 TOURO L. REV. 741, 743 (2008) (“[N]on-union 
members [have] the right to not have their dues used for political activities they did not agree with; 
the Washington law fulfills that by requiring the affirmative opt-in.  The Court did not say the 
Constitution requires this, only that the State of Washington could require it, if it chose.”).  That the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not require the affirmative consent of nonmembers to non-chargeable 
expenditures of union dues and fees troubled one commentator: “[T]he Court’s failure to require 
prior consent . . . appears to dispute Madison’s view requiring consent before the ideological 
burdens of membership can attach,” particularly in light of lower court determinations in Beck that 
nearly 80% of union dues were not chargeable and in Lehnert that nearly 90% of dues were spent on 
non-representational activity.  See Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 709-10. 
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discussed above involved “opt out” provisions, i.e., workers who object to expenditures 
of their dues “opt out” of paying a portion of their fees and dues for political purposes.  
The work imposed on the union by the Washington State “opt in” procedure will be 
likely be more burdensome than “an opt-out” procedure.  Rather than simply providing 
the workers the opportunity to object to the expenditure, the union must convince the 
worker to provide affirmative consent for political expenditures.  This may be a difficult 
task, particularly with those workers who were not willing to join the union in the first 
place.131  Likewise, while the record does not contain a calculation or estimate of the 
financial impact of an “opt out” and an “opt in” system, it appears likely that the “opt 
in” system will produce a smaller pot of money for political expenditures than an “opt 
out” system for two reasons.  First, the “opt out” procedure permits the union to use the 
dues of workers who do not receive or understand the form, misplace the form, simply 
forget to complete the form, or fail to do so in a timely manner.  The “opt-in” procedure 
prevents the union from using those fees.132  Second, the “opt-in” procedures increase 
administrative expenses, because the union is required to seek, obtain, and record the 
affirmative consent and to refund the political portion of the fees to all nonmembers 
who did not affirmatively agree.133 
                                                   
 
 
131 See Selmi, supra note 118, at 248 (“In most workplaces, non-members must affirmatively opt-out 
of the fee structure as a means of manifesting their lack of consent, but the state of Washington 
passed legislation requiring unions to gain the affirmative consent of the non-members before any 
of their fees could be used for election-related purposes.  Presumably very few non-members will 
give their affirmative consent since if they were willing to provide their consent one would also 
assume they would be willing to join the union.”). 
132 The rebate checks paid to those who objected to expenditures for political purposes were 
between $44 and $76 per person.  State of Washington v. Washington Educ. A’n, 130 P.3d at 355.   If 
all 3,500 nonmembers failed to opt in, the financial impact to WEA would be range from $154,000 to 
$266,000.    
133 It is interesting to consider whether Davenport’s upholding the substitution of “opt-in” 
provisions for “opt-out” provisions will pass muster in other First Amendment contexts.  In doing 
so, it is important to recall that Davenport determined the union has no First Amendment right to 
collect dues and service charges through payroll deductions.  Unlike Davenport, however, those 
who might object to switching opt-in provisions for opt-out provisions likely have a recognized 
First Amendment right that is negatively affected by the switch.  This is illustrated by a recent news 
report about a Rutgers University proposal to permit its undergraduate students to “opt-in” to the 
payment of the subscription fee for the Daily Targum, the student newspaper, rather than 
permitting the students to request a refund if they do not wish to subscribe.  See Rita Giordano, 
“Rutgers paper fights fee proposal,” PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, January 24, 2009, at B1, at 
http://www.philly.com/philly/education/20090124_Rutgers_paper_fights_fee_proposal.html 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2009) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen).  According to the editor of 
the Daily Targum, the proposal will “imperil the second-oldest college newspaper in the nation,” 
because it will substantially diminish student funding for the newspaper.  Id.  In contrast, the 
chairman of the Student Assembly favors the proposal, because “students shouldn't have to jump 
through hoops to get their money back.”  Id. 
Notably, courts have recognized a First Amendment right to financial support of student 
publications.  In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 
217, 233 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that First Amendment permits a public university to 
charge students mandatory fees segregated from the tuition charge to fund extracurricular student 
speech, provided viewpoint neutrality is employed in allocating funding to student organizations 
engaging in such speech.  The principal justification advanced for this decision is that universities 
should be permitted to “determine that its mission is well served if students have the means to 
engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects in 
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Fourth, U.S. Supreme Court’s determined that “unions have no constitutional 
entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.”134  While this appears to be 
inconsistent of the Court’s previous statement in Street that the union should not be 
sanctioned in favor of an employee who makes no complaint regarding the use if his or 
her money,135 the petitioner-nonmembers argued, and respondent-WEA expressly 
conceded, that a union has no constitutional right to collect an agency fee in the first 
place.136  At first blush this concession appears somewhat surprising.  Further reflection, 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall.”  Id.  Once the University makes this 
determination, it is “entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to these ends.”  
Id.; see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843, 845-846 (1961) (holding that Wisconsin State Bar 
Association rule requiring members to pay dues did not violate First Amendment rights of 
members of the bar, where dues are utilized to raise quality of professional services and the record 
does not disclose the fees are used to support political speech to which the members object). 
134 Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379. 
135 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 81 S. Ct. at 1803 (“The union receiving money exacted from an 
employee under a union-shop agreement should not in fairness be subjected to sanctions in favor of 
an employee who makes no complaint of the use of his money for such activities.”). 
136 Brief for Petitioners, at 17, at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/05-
1589_Petitioner.pdf (last visited May 13, 2009) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“unions 
have no constitutional right to collect fees from nonmembers.”);  Brief for Respondents. at 46 at 
http://www. abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/05-1657_Respondent.pdf (last 
visited May 14, 2008) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“Any union right to collect an 
agency fee is a matter of statutory authorization, not constitutional principle, and a state is thus 
constitutionally free to prohibit or decline to authorize an agency fee.”). 
Having conceded the absence of a First Amendment right to collect an agency fee, the union 
advanced alternate First Amendment arguments in support of its position: (1) once the fees were in 
the union’s possession, U.S. Supreme Court’s campaign finance law precedents require the Court to 
review the Washington statute under the strict scrutiny test; and (2) the Washington statute was an 
impermissible content-based restriction, because it focused on election-related expenses.  Both 
arguments were rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
 
Realizing its argument based on Hudson was going to come up short, the 
union turned to several more creative arguments.  First, it claimed that once 
the union had the fees in its possession, the Supreme Court’s campaign 
finance law precedent, which frequently requires strict scrutiny on how those 
funds are spent, would come into play.  While clever, the Court found the 
analogy inapt because the fees were only in the union’s possession because 
the state had compelled the employees to provide the fees, and the 
government coercion easily distinguished the Court’s prior campaign finance 
jurisprudence.  When the campaign finance argument ran aground, the 
unions switched to another powerful first amendment doctrine, contending 
that the state legislation was an impermissible content-based restriction 
because it singled out election-related expenditures.  This argument, 
however, called into question the Court’s entire doctrine in the area, as the 
union was effectively arguing that its use of nonmember fees could not be 
regulated, or at least could not be regulated when it came to expressive 
activity.  In its early cases, including its decision in Hudson, the Court had 
made clear that states could restrict the use of agency shop fees, and could, in 
fact, impose specific regulation on the use of those fees for election-related 
purposes. 
 
Selmi, supra note 118, at 250. 
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however, demonstrates it to be the correct conclusion for two principal reasons.  To 
begin with, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment rights of labor 
unions and their members are no different than those given to all individuals.137  Those 
rights are “the right of an individual to speak freely, to advocate ideas, to associate with 
others, and to petition his government for redress of grievances . . . [and] the right of 
associations to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members.”138  It is difficult to 
argue convincingly that the right to associate with others encompasses a constitutional 
right to use for political purposes the compelled fees of nonmembers when they have 
decided for whatever reason not to join the union.  Secondly, U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions upholding right to work laws belies the existence of a First Amendment right 
of the union to collect fees and dues.139  In upholding those laws, the Court rejected a 
lower court argument that the right of association somehow supports a constitutional 
right to compel union membership to enhance the effectiveness of the union.140  The 
Court has also determined “there is no constitutional duty to bargain collectively with 
an exclusive bargaining agent,”141 and right to work laws do not interfere with First 
Amendment rights.142  In short, unions have no supplemental First Amendment rights 
by virtue of their representation of workers in the collective bargaining process 
permitting it to collect the agency fee from the workers it represents. 
By eviscerating any First Amendment entitlement on the part of the union to dues 
                                                   
 
 
137 Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 99 S. Ct. 1826, 1827 (1979).  The court noted: 
 
[T]he First Amendment is not a substitute for the national labor relations 
laws.  The fact that procedures followed by a public employer in bypassing 
the union and dealing directly with its members might well be unfair labor 
practices were federal statutory law applicable hardly establishes that such 
procedures violate the Constitution.  The First Amendment right to associate 
and to advocate ‘provides no guarantee that a speech will persuade or that 
advocacy will be effective.’  The public employee surely can associate and 
speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the First Amendment 
from retaliation for doing so.  But the First Amendment does not impose any 
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this 
context, to recognize the association and bargain with it. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
138 Id.   
139 See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 69 S. Ct. 251, 254 (1949) 
(holding that state statutes in Nebraska and North Carolina prohibiting employers from entering 
into contracts to exclude non-union members from employment do not violate the First 
Amendment, because “[i]t is difficult to see how enforcement of this state policy could infringe the 
freedom of speech of anyone, or deny to anyone the right to assemble or to petition for redress of 
grievances.  And appellants do not contend that the laws expressly forbid the full exercise of those 
rights by unions or union members.”). 
140 Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 99 S. Ct. at 1827.  
141 Id. at 1828 n.2.   
142 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 69 S. Ct. 251, 254 (1949) (“Nothing 
in the language of [right to work] laws indicates a purpose to prohibit speech, assembly, or petition.  
Precisely what these state laws do is to forbid employers acting alone or in concert with labor 
organizations deliberately to restrict employment to none but union members.”); accord Am. Fed’n 
of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 69 S. Ct. 258 (1948) (upholding the constitutionality of an Arizona 
state constitutional amendment which prohibited employment discrimination against non-union 
employees but not against union employees). 
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and fees, the Court has removed any union interest against which to balance the 
restrictions authorized by the state, thereby possibly giving the states unfettered right to 
impose any additional restrictions on the union’s access to dues and fees it chooses, 
including content-based restrictions.  The only other countervailing interests that may 
serve as a check on the restrictions a state may impose on union access to dues and fees 
are those interests promoted by mandatory union representation: bringing order and 
peace to labor relations and achieving efficiencies in negotiating and administering 
collective bargaining agreements and settling disputes.  State restrictions on union 
access to dues and fees may presumably be challenged if those restrictions threaten 
labor relations and efficiencies in collective bargaining and dispute resolution.  Given 
the severity of that test, however, perhaps unions might be better served by eschewing 
state directed access to union dues and relying solely on the collective bargaining 
agreements with employers to obtain dues and fees through payroll deduction.143 
 
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF DAVENPORT  
 
By not addressing certain issues, Davenport postpones questions that may have to 
be addressed in the future.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court did not review the union’s 
collection of service fees in excess of those needed for collective bargaining, contract 
administration, and grievance adjustment.144  This permits the union to avoid its Hudson 
obligations as discussed in Part II above: (1) preliminarily estimating the proportion of 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses and reducing the dues charged the 
nonmembers by the portion of nonchargeable expenses; (2) providing nonmembers 
information which describes how the proportionate share of chargeable and 
nonchargeable expenses was calculated; (3) including in the information disclosed the 
estimated expenditures for collective bargaining and administration that benefited all 
members and nonmembers alike and for which a fee could be charged; and (4) 
providing nonmembers with the right to object to the union’s determination of what 
expenses were chargeable and nonchargeable.  Notably, Hudson requires that 
obligations (2) and (3) take place prior to step (4) so that the nonmember has sufficient 
information to challenge those expenses that the union claims are chargeable.145  As 
noted by one commentator:  
 
[T]he mere collection of that portion of the agency fee that represents 
expenditures for political activities rather than collective bargaining . 
. . violates the First Amendment on its face, regardless whether 
                                                   
 
 
143 Union access to dues and fees of public sector employees is mandated in only half of the states.  
Brief of Petitioners, at 18, at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/05-
1589_Petitioner.pdf (last visited May 13, 2008) (original in possession of Edward J. Schoen) (“In fact, 
nearly half of the states do not authorize the assessment of compelled fees at all in the public 
sector.”). 
144 See Jaffe, supra. note 109, at 116-17. 
145 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1076 (1986) (“Basic considerations of 
fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that the potential 
objectors be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.  Leaving the 
nonunion employee in the dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee - and requiring 
them to object in order to receive information - does not adequately protect the careful distinctions 
drawn in Abood.”).  See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 129-30. 
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employees are allowed to seek reimbursement by jumping through 
the formal procedural hoops for opting out each year.146 
 
The Washington State procedures upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court do not include 
these provisions and a subsequent challenge to them may arise. 
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that the language in Street indicating that 
dissent is not to be presumed is equally applicable to union shop and agency shop 
organizations.147  Notably, however, Street involved a union shop arrangement, in 
which all employees must be a member of the union as a condition of employment, and 
some union members voluntarily agree to be associated with the union and its political 
activities and others do not.  Because there is no easy way to identify who is a voluntary 
member and who is not in a union shop arrangement, it is fair to assume that dissent is 
not to be presumed as to all union members and to require the nonvoluntary members 
to come forward and notify the union of their dissent.148  In contrast, members of an 
agency shop are not required to become members of the union, but are required only to 
pay as a service fee that portion of union dues attributable to collective bargaining, 
contract administration, and grievance adjustment.  Because they elected not to become 
members of the union, for whatever reasons, they are easily identified.  Hence requiring 
the union to take affirmative steps to protect their First Amendment rights is less 
burdensome in the agency shop than in the union shop.149  In the former instance, the 
union must contact only nonmembers to obtain their affirmative consent; in the latter 
instance, the union must reach out to all members to obtain their affirmative consent. 
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court justifies its conclusion that the union has no First 
Amendment right to the service fees of nonmembers, because “it is uncontested that it 
would be constitutional for Washington to eliminate agency fees entirely.”150  This 
language may be an attempt to revive the “if we can ban it then we can regulate it” 
approach utilized by the Court to resolve First Amendment issues in the commercial 
speech arena.  In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,151 the U.S. 
Supreme Court justified its upholding of a ban on advertising casino gambling aimed to 
residents of Puerto Rico on the grounds the legislature could also decide to prohibit 
gambling.152  The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter backed away from its “greater-
includes-the lesser” reasoning in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,153 noting that “it is 
inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine,” and that ”banning speech may 
sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.”154  Perhaps the “greater-
                                                   
 
 
146 See Jaffe, supra note 109, at 127. 
147 Id. at 123. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 123-24.   
150 Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. at 2378.  In one commentator’s view, the use of 
this language by the Court “effectively issued an invitation to all of the states” to eliminate agency 
fees entirely.  See Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 700.   
151 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986). 
152 Id. at 2979 (“[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition 
of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of 
allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising.”).  
153 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
154 Id. at 1512.  See Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, Joe Camel and 44 Liquormart: Has the FDA 
Gone Too Far,” 27 ACAD. LEGAL STUD. BUS. NAT’L PROC. 191, 193-94 (1998); Edward J. Schoen et al., 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott: California Fruit Marketing Orders Prune the First Amendment, 10 
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includes-the lesser” analysis has experienced a resurrection.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Street and Abood and their progeny have created a fairly coherent body of 
principles governing the First Amendment implications of unions’ use of employee fees 
and service charges for political purposes.  Such expenditures violate the First 
Amendment rights of those employees who object, and the union is required to refund 
that portion of the dues and fees used for political purposes plus accrued interest to 
objecting employees and to reduce future dues and fee payments by the percentage 
union expenditures for political and ideological purposes bears to total union 
expenditures.  In order that employees make an informed decision on whether or not to 
object to the expenditures, the union must disclose the proportion of chargeable and 
nonchargeable expenses, explain how that proportion was computed, disclose the 
estimated expenditures for collective bargaining and administration that benefits all 
members and nonmembers alike, and provide employees with the opportunity to 
communicate their objections to the union.  Further, union expenditures cannot be 
deemed chargeable unless they are necessarily or reasonably incurred for, and germane 
to, the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees 
in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues, thereby advancing labor 
peace and avoiding free riding.  Finally, any dispute between the employee and the 
union regarding about chargeable expenditures must be resolved by an impartial 
decision maker in a reasonably prompt manner.   
While Ysursis does not appear to have departed from these principles, Davenport 
seems to have sidestepped them in upholding the “opt in” restrictions on the use of 
nonmember dues and service fees for political or ideological purposes.  Instead of 
resolving the issues presented by applying those principles, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rebutted the Washington State Supreme Court’s reasoning, disclaimed any First 
Amendment right on the part of the union to collect fees and services, and approved the 
adoption of more restrictive protections of the nonmembers’ First Amendment right not 
to be compelled to support political views with which they disagree.  The reason for 
this, of course, is that the Court was not judging the constitutionality of how the union 
handled objecting employees’ dues and fees (as was the case in Street and Abood and 
their progeny), but was reviewing the constitutionality of the state’s enhanced 
restrictions on the union’s handling objecting employees’ dues and fees.  In Street and 
Abood and their progeny, objecting employees claimed their First Amendment rights 
were violated and they prevailed.  In Davenport, the union claimed its rights were 
violated and it did not prevail.155  Further, the intersection of Street and Abood and their 
progeny with Davenport and its potential progeny will probably not occur, because 
employees are not likely to challenge enhanced state-imposed restrictions making it 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 21, 55 (2000).  
155 Notably, the unions’ First Amendment arguments were raised as a defense to the two lawsuits 
brought respectively by the State of Washington and nonmembers of the union.  See Selmi, supra 
note 118, at 249 (“[G]iven that the union’s challenge arose as a defense, one might have expected 
the Court to be relatively gentle in reversing the Washington Supreme Court’s decision but the 
Court did not appear to be in a genteel mood.  Indeed, in a unanimous opinion . . . the Court 
seemed to wonder aloud how the union could have the audacity to bring this challenge, forgetting, 
of course, that the challenge arose as a defense to two major lawsuits.”). 
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harder for unions to access their dues and fees, and, lacking any First Amendment right 
to access dues and fees, the union lacks standing to dispute those restrictions. 
Nonetheless, by not upholding the Washington State statute on the grounds it 
provided better protection of the objecting members’ First Amendment rights and by 
overlooking the union’s collection of dues and fees without adhering to all of the 
Hudson requirements, Davenport may have reached the right conclusion for the wrong 
reasons in an opinion that potentially erodes First Amendment protections accorded 
nonmembers of an agency shop not to be charged service fees in excess of collective 
bargaining costs.156  If so, except for providing the foundation for the Ysursa decision, 
Davenport hopefully “will be remembered and relied on primarily for its result, not for 
its reasoning,” and “future cases will apply First Amendment principles with greater 
vigor,”157 particularly when the employment of the opt-in provisions restricts the first 
amendment rights of the parties upon whom the restrictions are imposed. 
 
                                                   
 
 
156 See Jaffe, supra. note 109, at 131.  
157 Id.   
